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MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS: UPHOLDING THE
GOALS AND GUARANTEES OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal
defendants the right to confront witnesses who bring testimony against
them.' The Clause is generally interpreted to afford criminal defendants
the right to cross-examine adversarial witnesses live in court, under oath,
and in the presence of the trier of fact. 2 Historically, accusatory testi-
mony by absent witnesses was admissible in some situations, though
with the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, the right to have an accuser
present at a criminal trial became virtually absolute.3 Nevertheless, as
advances in technology ushered in new kinds of evidence, courts often
disagreed about which of these novel categories were subject to the
Clause.4
The admissibility of scientific evidence has certainly been no excep-
tion to this ongoing debate.5 One issue stemming from this uncertainty-
whether scientific evidence in the form of affidavits containing test re-
sults is admissible in court absent live testimony 6was answered by the
United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.7 Con-
cluding such affidavits constitute testimonial evidence,8 Melendez-Diaz
rightly subjected scientific analysts to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment.9
Part I of this Comment gives a brief description of the history and
case law behind the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and opinions in
Melendez-Diaz. Part III commends the Melendez-Diaz Court for uphold-
ing the purposes, guarantees, and historical intentions behind the Con-
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2. Maryland v. Craig,497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990).
3. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004) (discussing the history
of the Confrontation Clause).
4. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009) (commenting on
conflicting state laws exempting scientific affidavits from confrontation).
5. See Lisa Gonzalez, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of
Frye v. United States, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1993) (noting that "rapid developments in
scientific knowledge" have forced courts to readdress the admissibility of scientific evidence).
6. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530 (presenting this question).
7. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
8. Id. at 2530.
9. See id. at 2532 (holding certificates of analysis subject to the Confrontation Clause).
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frontation Clause. This Comment concludes by noting that the practical
implications of Melendez-Diaz are aligned with the overall goals of the
Confrontation Clause.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment sets forth the constitutional rights afforded to
defendants in "all criminal prosecutions."10 The Confrontation Clause-
made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment"-
provides that all criminal defendants have the right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against" them.12 As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the Clause ensures that criminal defendants retain the right to be con-
fronted face-to-face with sworn-in witnesses, in the presence of the trier
of fact, by reserving the right to cross-examine witnesses that testify
against them.' Designed to ensure the reliability of evidence,14 the
Clause acts as a safeguard for the basic rights guaranteed to all criminal
defendants.' 5
Prior to 2004, out-of-court accusatory statements 6 were admissible
in criminal trials if they bore an adequate indicia of reliability.17 Today,
however, the Confrontation Clause requires that a criminal defendant
have the opportunity to cross-examine an accusatory witness who is un-
available for trial in order for his or her statements to be admissible.' 8
10. U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.").
I1. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the Confrontation Clause applies
to both state and federal governments through the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970)).
14. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,61 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
15. See id. at 42 (majority opinion) (identifying the Confrontation Clause as a "bedrock pro-
cedural guarantee" and noting its importance).
16. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 58-61, 77 (1980) (holding a transcript of a witness's
preliminary examination testimony constitutionally admissible evidence), abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
17. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. "Indicia of reliability" can be defined as those factors or circum-
stances that allow a jury to hear an out-of-court statement, despite a lack of confrontation of the
declarant. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (finding an indicia of reliability in a
statement that contained "no express assertion about past fact," contained a high level of personal
knowledge, was not likely to be based on poor memory, and was made spontaneously).
18. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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B. Ohio v. Roberts' 9 and the Now Abrogated "Reliability " Test
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that the admission of preliminary
hearing testimony without the speaker's presence in court satisfied con-
stitutional standards. 20 In Roberts, the defendant was charged with for-
gery and possession of stolen credit cards. 21 During the preliminary hear-
ing, the defense unsuccessfully tried to elicit an admission from the vic-
tim's daughter that she provided the defendant with the checks and credit
cards.22 The victim's daughter never appeared at trial despite being
23served with five subpoenas. At trial, the defendant testified that the
victim's daughter had given him the checkbook and credit cards-along
with permission to use them.24 On rebuttal, the State offered the tran-
script of the daughter's preliminary hearing testimony as evidence to the
25contrary. The trial court admitted the evidence and the defendant was
convicted.26
After the Ohio Supreme Court vacated the conviction,27 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that an unavailable wit-
ness's out-of-court statement was admissible if the statement bore an
adequate "indicia of reliability." 28 The Court reasoned that the prelimi-
nary hearing testimony fit this reliability requirement because it "af-
forded the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement." 29 The majority further held that reliability could be in-
ferred "where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion',o or upon a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."31
19. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
20. See id. at 74-77.
21. Id. at 58.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id.
25. Id. (relying on the Ohio statute that permitted the use of preliminary hearing testimony
when a witness was unavailable).
26. Id. at 60.
27. Id. at 60-61.
28. Id. at 62, 66.
29. Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that "there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], and counsel
... availed himself of that opportunity" (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. "Hearsay" is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Hearsay exceptions include, among others, present sense impres-
sion, excited utterance, then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, statements for pur-
poses of medical diagnosis or treatment, recorded recollection, and records of regularly conducted
activity. FED. R. EVID. 803(l)-(6).
31. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The Court went on to explain that the purpose of cross-
examination is "to challenge 'whether the declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the
truth, whether the declarant accurately perceived and remembered the matter he related, and whether
the declarant's intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he employed."' Id. at 71
(quoting David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1378, 1378 (1972)).
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In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for dispensing
with the right of confrontation "so lightly." 32 The decision was also criti-
cized for creating an unpredictable rule that produced results contrary to
the intentions of the Confrontation Clause.33 Abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington3 4 in 2004,3s the Roberts reliability approach was rejected as
a "malleable standard [that] often fails to protect against paradigmatic
confrontation violations."36
C. Crawford v. Washington
In Crawford v. Washington, the defendant stabbed the victim after
learning that the victim tried to rape his wife.37 Officers took a recorded
statement from the defendant's wife after the stabbing.3 ' At trial, the
prosecution introduced into evidence the wife's tape-recorded statement
describing the stabbing to the police. 3 9 The defense did not have an op-
portunity to cross-examine the defendant's wife40 and the defendant was
convicted. 41 The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and created a
new standard, holding that testimonial statements in a criminal prosecu-
tion are only admissible-absent live testimony-where the witness is
unavailable42 and where the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. 43 Distinguishing between testimonial and non-
testimonial evidence, the majority recognized the "core class of 'testimo-
nial' statements" 44 as including affidavits, depositions, prior statements
not subject to cross-examination, and statements "made under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 45
The Crawford Court abrogated the Roberts46 decision, relying heav-
ily upon the text and history of the Confrontation Clause.47 The majority
32. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (criticizing the Roberts test for
admitting "core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude").
34. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
35. See id. at 68-69.
36. Id. at 60.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 39-40.
39. Id. at 40.
40. Id. (explaining that the defendant's wife did not testify because of the state marital privi-
lege law, which barred her from testifying without the defendant's consent).
41. Id. at 41.
42. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (describing "unavailability" as the inability to
procure a witness despite good-faith attempts to locate and present the witness).
43. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
44. Id. at 51-52.
45. Id. (quoting Brief for the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
21754961 at *3).
46. Id. at 63-64.
47. See id. at 60-63 (stating that the Roberts reliability approach departed from the historical
principles of discouraging the use of ex parte evidence and the admission of testimonial statements
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reasoned that the Roberts reliability approach operated on a model that
was "amorphous, if not entirely subjective." 48 The Crawford Court went
on to conclude that "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy the constitutional demands is
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation."49
D. Davis v. Washington5 0
In Davis v. Washington, the Court granted certiorari to the consoli-
dated cases of Adrian Davis and Hershel Hammon in order to further
define "testimonial" in the context of out-of-court statements made to
law enforcement personnel.5 ' Davis's case involved the admissibility of
statements made during a 911 call related to an in progress domestic dis-
52turbance. The victim made statements to a 911 operator both during the
attack and after the defendant left the house. Although,the victim did
not appear for trial, the State successfully admitted a portion 54 of the vic-
tim's 911 call into evidence-leading to the defendant's conviction.
The Court, reviewed the constitutionality of the admitted evidence and
held that the statements were nontestimonial, and therefore, immune
from the reach of the Confrontation Clause.56 The majority noted that
because the statements were made "about events as they were actually
happening" and were "necessary to be able to resolve the present emer-
gency,"57 they did not constitute testimonial evidence. Moreover, the
Court reasoned that statements made during 911 calls or at crime scenes
are generally nontestimonial in nature if "circumstances objectively indi-
cat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."58 The Court considered sev-
eral factors in making this determination: the timing of the statement, the
existence of an emergency, the primary purpose of the statement, and the
level of formality surrounding the circumstances under which the state-
ments were made.59
Hammon's case involved a domestic violence dispute and centered
on the admissibility of the victim's written statements in an affidavit
not subjected to cross-examination because the test "often fail[ed] to protect against paradigmatic
confrontation violations").
48. Id. at 63.
49. Id. at 68-69.
50. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
51. See id. at 817.
52. Id
53. Id. at 817-18.
54. See id. at 826-29 (stating that the admissible portion of the call consisted only of the
victim's nontestimonial statements like those that relayed information vital to police intervention).
55. Id. at 819.
56. Id. at 828.
57. Id. at 827.
58. Id at 822.
59. See id.
2010] 275
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
recorded by the police after the incident concluded.60 Because the victim
did not appear for the defendant's trial, the State admitted the affidavit as
evidence of the defendant's guilt. As a result, the defendant was con-
62victed of battery. The Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, rea-
soned that the lack of an ongoing emergency, in tandem with police
questioning, constituted "part of an investigation into possibl[e] criminal
past conduct," rendering the statements testimonial and subject to the
Confrontation Clause.63 The Court explained that a statement is testimo-
nial when "the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."6 4
II. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MAASSACHUSETTS
A. Facts
In 2001, Boston police responded to a tip reporting the suspicious
behavior of Thomas Wright.65 An informant alleged that Wright fre-
quently received phone calls at work that prompted him to leave, wait for
a blue sedan outside his place of employment, enter the car, and return in
the same vehicle a short time later.66 After observing this exact succes-
sion of events, officers arrested Wright and the two men in the blue se-
dan-one of whom was Luis Melendez-Diaz-on suspicion of drug pos-
67session.
On the drive to the police station with the three men, the officers
observed the men "fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back
of the car."68 A search of the police car revealed nineteen small plastic
69
bags containing a substance resembling cocaine hidden in the back seat.
A similar substance was found during a personal search of Wright. 70 Po-
lice submitted the substance to a state laboratory for chemical analysis
and identification.
Laboratory analysts produced and swore to certificates of analysis
stating the substance in the bags was found to be cocaine. 72 Melendez-
60. Id. at 820.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 821.
63. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30 (stating that "the product of the interrogation in Hammon is a
much easier task, since they were not much different from the statements we found to be testimonial
in Crawford").
64. Id. at 822.




69. Id. (noting that the bags were hidden in a partition between the front and back seats).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2531 (mentioning that the certificates were sworn to before a public notary).
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Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine. 73 Three cer-
tificates of analysis were submitted into evidence at trial, along with the
bags seized from Wright and the police car.74
B. Procedural History
At trial, Melendez-Diaz argued that the Supreme Court's recent
Confrontation Clause decision, Crawford v. Washington, required the
state lab analyst to offer live testimony.75 Despite this argument, the trial
court admitted the scientific certificates into evidence as "'prima facie
evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic ...
analyzed.'" 76 Consequently, the jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of dis-
77tributing and trafficking cocaine.
On appeal, Melendez-Diaz again asserted a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. The Appeals Court of Massachu-
setts held the admission of the certificates constitutional, relying on a
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case,79 which exempted certifi-
cates of analysis from confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.so After
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied review, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
C. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the Massachusetts appellate courts, finding the
admission of the certificates unconstitutional.82 The majority, applying
Crawford,8 3 held that because the certificates of analysis constituted affi-
davits, they fell within the "core class of testimonial statements" covered
by the Confrontation Clause.84 The Court further held that because Me-
lendez-Diaz was never provided with an opportunity to cross-examine
the analyst who prepared the certificates, his right to confront the witness
under the Sixth Amendment had been violated.
73. Id. at 2530.
74. Id. at 2530-31.
75. Id. at 2531 (noting Melendez-Diaz's objection to the admission of the certificates at trial).






82. Id. at 2542.
83. Id. at 2532-33 (stating that the decision is a "rather straightforward application" of Craw-
ford).
84. Id. at 2532. The forensic reports contemplated in Melendez-Diaz fall firmly within the
testimonial category; and therefore the emergency/non-emergency distinction in Davis is not useful
in the discussion of scientific analysts. Id.
85. Id.
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The majority went on to reject various arguments raised by the State
of Massachusetts and the dissent.8 6 First, the Court rejected the argument
that the non-accusatory nature of the certificates rendered them nontes-
timonial.8 7 Instead, the Court concluded that the certificates themselves
constituted the "witnesses against [the defendant],"88 whom Melendez-
Diaz had a right to confront.89 Second, relying primarily on Davis, the
Court found that the scientific nature of the testimony was not grounds
for removing analysts from the coverage of the Confrontation Clause. 90
Third, the Court dismissed the respondent's arguments that the neutral,
scientific nature of the testimony excluded analysts from confrontation as
"little more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in Rob-
erts." 91 The majority also held that a defendant's right to subpoena the
analyst who prepared the report was not a substitute for his or her right to
confrontation. 92
Finally, the Court reasoned that the demands of the Confrontation
Clause may not be relaxed in order to expedite the judicial process.93
While acknowledging the increased burden its holding places on prose-
cutors, the Court ultimately rejected the dissent's claim that requiring
analysts to testify imposed too high a burden on criminal prosecutions.94
In doing so, the "simplest form" of notice-and-demand statutes9 were
upheld as a constitutional way to expedite trials of this nature.96
D. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas clarified his position that out-of-
court statements governed by the Confrontation Clause were limited to
those "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."97 Justice Thomas joined the
opinion of the Court because the certificates of analysis were "quite
plainly affidavits" and therefore, subject to the right of confrontation. 98
86. Id. at 2532-42 (responding to "a potpourri" of arguments advanced by the dissent and
respondent).
87. Id. at 2533.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2532.
90. Id. at 2535.
91. Id. at 2536. The Court relied on Crawford's holding that a statement's purpose will de-
termine whether it is testimonial or nontestimonial. Id. at 2532.
92. Id. at 2540.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2541 ("In their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecution to
provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial, after which
the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence
absent the analyst's appearance live at trial.").
96. Id.





The dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito, criticized the majority for
discarding "an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evi-
dence." 99 Justice Kennedy offered numerous arguments as to why the
introduction of scientific analysis into evidence should be allowed with-
out an analyst's testimony. 00 First, he noted that the Court's failure to
define the word "analyst" could lead to confusion and inconsistencies as
to which scientists must testify at trial.10 ' Next, Justice Kennedy argued
that a number of suitable alternatives were available for defendants who
wished to challenge scientific evidence brought against them.102 These
options included serving subpoenas, seeking independent scientific tests,
forming opposing arguments, and objecting to the admission of evi-
dence.103 The dissent further stated that laboratory analysts were not the
kind of conventional witnesses subject to the Confrontation Clause.104
Justice Kennedy distinguished between analysts and conventional wit-
nesses by reasoning that analysts record near-contemporaneous events as
opposed to past observations,'05 they do not testify "against the defen-
dant," 06 and they do not respond to questions under interrogation. 07
The dissent also listed a number of adverse results that could stem
from the majority's decision'08-including unjust, technical dismissals
on account of analysts unavailable to give testimony for reasons such as
death, illness, or travel.109 He further argued that requiring analysts to
testify at trial could result in an increase of "not guilty" verdicts,no an
increase in administrative costs, the creation of a "new prosecutorial
duty,""' a substantial burden on analysts' time, and an inundation of
cases requiring the presence of analysts in court.112
99. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 2543-53.
101. See id. at 2544 (noting that many people play a role in preparing a test's results and the
majority opinion does not clarify which of these people the defendant has a right to confront).
102. See id. at 2547-49.
103. Id. at 2547.
104. Id. at 2550-51.
105. Id. at 2551.
106. Id. at 2552 (noting that analysts rarely have knowledge of the defendant's identity or "of
an aspect of the defendant's guilt").
107. Id.
108. See id. at 2549-50.
109. Id. at 2550.
110. Id. ("The result, in many cases, will be that the prosecution cannot meet its burden of
proof, and the guilty defendant goes free on a technicality that, because it results in an acquittal,
cannot be reviewed on appeal.").
111. Id. at 2556.
112. See id at 2549-50.
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III. ANALYSIS
The Melendez-Diaz Court properly aligned its decision with the
goals and guarantees of the Confrontation Clause. First, the limitations
and deterrents created by Melendez-Diaz furthered the fundamental goals
of ensuring the reliability of evidence" 3 and avoiding the use of ex
partell4 examinations as evidence against criminal defendants.' 5 Second,
the guarantees of face-to-face confrontation' 16 and cross-examination'' 7
remain strong after the Court's decision. Furthermore, Melendez-Diaz
advanced the Framer's intent of securing rights for criminal defendants
by firmly reinforcing the underlying principles behind the Confrontation
Clause.
A. Upholding the Fundamental Goals of the Confrontation Clause
The holdings of Melendez-Diaz and Crawford reveal two primary
goals of the Confrontation Clause: (1) ensuring the reliability of evi-
dence, and (2) preventing the use of ex parte examinations and accusa-
tory out-of-court statements where the defendant is unable to cross-
examine.1" 9 The Supreme Court recognized the reliability of evidence as
the Clause's "ultimate goal." 20 Melendez-Diaz maintained this goal by
establishing a deterrent for admitting unreliable evidence and broadening
the class of testimony subject to the Confrontation Clause.121 Similarly,
Crawford identified the use of ex parte examinations as the "principal
evil" the Confrontation Clause was intended to prevent.122 The Court's
decision in Melendez-Diaz advanced this goal by moving Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence in a direction that avoids the admission of ex parte
testimony.
1. Reliability
The Melendez-Diaz Court identified the Confrontation Clause's "ul-
timate goal" as ensuring the reliability of evidence, which is accom-
plished by requiring that the evidence undergo cross-examination.123 The
Court found that there was nothing uniquely reliable about scientific evi-
dence and it is subject to cross-examination under the Sixth Amend-
113. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (identifying
reliability of evidence as the Confrontation Clause's "ultimate goal").
114. See id. at 49 (describing ex parle depositions as statements made by witnesses who have
not been subject to cross-examination).
115. Id. at 50.
116. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990) (discussing the importance of face-to-
face confrontation to the Confrontation Clause).
117. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-56 (discussing the importance of cross-examination as it
relates to the Confrontation Clause).
118. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009).
119. Id. at 2531.
120. Id. at 2536 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
121. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
122. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
123. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
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ment.124 The Melendez-Diaz Court stated that "[c]onfrontation is one
means of assuring accurate forensic analysis."1 25 Confrontation is meant
to expose both fraudulently and honestly produced erroneous evi-
dence.126 Finally, the right to confrontation does not vanish because other
state or federal procedures, such as the ability to subpoena analysts, are
aimed at ensuring reliability.127 Instead, the Confrontation Clause stands
as a fundamental safeguard in criminal prosecutions against unreliable
evidence. 128
The Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz furthers the goal of ensuring
the reliability of evidence by reducing opportunities for false information
to go unnoticed and by providing criminal defendants every opportunity
to expose fraudulent data. 129 After Melendez-Diaz, prosecutors are on
notice that their forensic evidence will be subject to the Confrontation
Clause.130 The case, therefore, acts as a deterrent to introducing unreli-
able evidence in the first place. 1 For example, knowledge that lab ana-
lysts are subject to cross-examination will likely compel prosecutors to
investigate the reliability of any forensic analysis before trial. Conse-
quently, Melendez-Diaz results in more reliable evidence because it dis-
courages the prosecution from initially introducing inadequate evi-
dence. 132
Furthermore, Melendez-Diaz broadened the categories of evidence
requiring cross-examination and provided criminal defendants with an
opportunity to expose certain weaknesses in the evidence brought against
them. 133 As a result, Melendez-Diaz ensures that more reliable evidence
will be available to the trier of fact by allowing them to consider a
broader range of facts surrounding the evidence presented.134 For exam-
ple, before Melendez-Diaz, some juries would only be presented with the
fact that a laboratory affidavit confirmed the identification of a sub-
stance. 35 Now, juries will receive information regarding an analyst's
proficiency, a machine's calibration, and a lab's reputation.1 36 Confronta-
tion may even lead to the discovery that no testing was ever performed
124. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (explaining how forensic evidence is not immune
to manipulation because forensic scientists often need to answer precise questions regarding a spe-
cific case and may feel pressured to compromise methodology for the sake of expediency).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2537 ("Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but
the incompetent one as well.").
127. Id. at 2540.
128. See id. at 2536.
129. Id. at 2536-37.
130. See id. at 2532.
131. Seeid.at2537.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 2532.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 2554-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136. 5 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 34:27.35 (7th ed.
2010).
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on the substance at issue.' Conversely, cross-examination may reveal
that a lab had a 99.9% accuracy rate and employed the most esteemed
analysts in the country. Either way, the trier of fact will gain more infor-
mation about the evidence brought against the defendant, and will there-
fore have a deeper understanding about that evidence's reliability.
Finally, had the Melendez-Diaz Court affirmed the lower court's
decision, the reliability of evidence in criminal prosecutions would have
deteriorated.'3 8 This is true because many kinds of evidentiary facts
would be held to very low standards of accountability. 139 The trier of fact
would never have the opportunity to learn how some evidence was col-
lected, analyzed, or handled.14 0 Juries and judges would lack crucial
knowledge about the reliability of certain facts and the truth regarding
weaknesses in the prosecution's case.141 Furthermore, analysts that pro-
duce the evidence ultimately used against a defendant at trial might never
be called to testify regarding the grave impact of their work product. 142
Had the Melendez-Diaz court held differently, the decision would not
promote reliable evidence.
2. Avoiding Ex Parte Examinations as Evidence
The decision in Crawford centered on avoiding the use of ex parte
evidence.143 Instead of shifting the goal of the Confrontation Clause
away from reliability,14 4 Crawford simply shed light on another purpose
of the Clause. In Crawford, the Court stated that "the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused." 45 In this statement, the Crawford Court
referred to the practice of admitting out-of-court statements into evidence
without providing the defendant with an opportunity to cross-examine
the speaker.146 Ex parte evidence has been deemed "utterly incompe-
137. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37 (majority opinion) (discussing "drylabbing"-a
procedure in which some analysts prepare scientific reports authenticating results of tests that were
never performed).
138. Id. at 2536 (discussing how confrontation assures accurate forensic analysis by exposing
and deterring fraudulent scientific reports).
139. Id. (stating that cross-examination may be the only way to challenge the results of scien-
tific tests that cannot be repeated-like autopsies and breathalyzers).
140. Id. at 2537 ("Like expert witnesses generally, an analyst's lack of proper training or
deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination.").
141. Id. at 2535. For example, Melendez-Diaz's trier of fact would be unaware of the fact that
the scientific affidavits were completed almost a week after the tests were performed. Id.
142. Id. at 2533-34.
143. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
144. Christopher B. Mueller, Cross-Examination Earlier or Later: When is it Enough to Satisfy
Crawford?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2006) (advancing the argument that Crawford properly
shifted the goal of the Confrontation Clause away from reliability).
145. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.




tent"l47 and abhorrentl48 because of its unreliable and malleable nature.149
The Confrontation Clause is a crucial safeguard against this kind of prac-
tice.150
The holding in Melendez-Diaz advanced the goal of avoiding the
use of ex parte testimony as evidence. By holding that forensic analysts
are subject to cross examination, the Court made it clear that Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence should move toward, and not away from, al-
lowing confrontation. As the Court reasoned, "the paradigmatic case
identifies the core of the right to confrontation, not its limits."'5 1 Melen-
dez-Diaz established these limits in a way that avoids a slippery-slope
toward admission of ex parte examinations.
B. Upholding the Fundamental Guarantees of the Confrontation Clause
Not only did Melendez-Diaz promote the goals at which the Con-
frontation Clause is aimed, it also upheld the guarantees promised to
individual criminal defendants. It is generally accepted that the Clause
guarantees the right of face-to-face confrontation and the right to cross-
examination.152 The Court's Melendez-Diaz decision guarded these two
guarantees, which are fundamental to the right of confrontation.
1. Face-to-Face Confrontation
As the Crawford Court noted, the right to face one's accusers dates
back to early Roman and English common law.1 53 This right allows the
trier of fact to observe the witness under questioning, 154 provides an op-
portunity for an accuser to tell the truth under oath,'55 and gives the de-
fendant an opportunity to face his or her accuser.156 Melendez-Diaz
rightly granted defendants the opportunity to come face-to-face with the
scientific analysts who produced the evidence used against them at trial.
As Justice Scalia opined, "the analyst who provides false results may,
under oath in open court, reconsider his false testimony." 57 The re
147. Id. at 49.
148. Id. at 48.
149. Id. at 50.
150. Id.
151. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009) (referring again to Sir
Walter Raleigh's trial).
152. Marc C. McAllister, The Disguised Witness and Crawford's Uneasy Tension with Craig:
Bringing Uniformity to the Supreme Court's Confrontation Jurisprudence, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 481,
519 (2010) (referring to "Face-to-Face Confrontation and Cross-Examination as the Two Pillars of
Confrontation"). See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (discussing throughout
the importance of face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination).
153. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
154. See id.
155. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37.
156. Jeffery L. Fisher, Preface: Reclaiming Criminal Procedure, 38 GEO L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC., at iii, ix (2009) (expounding on the importance of face-to-face confrontation in the
criminal justice system).
157. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
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quirement of live confrontation will cause analysts to be more careful in
their work and more conscious of its effect at trial. Furthermore, the
Court ensured that the right to face-to-face confrontation would not be
chipped away at over the years. The majority did this by holding forensic
test results to the same standard as any other testimonial evidence offered
against criminal defendants.158 Had the Court held otherwise, it would
have undermined the fundamental guarantee to confront one's accuser
face-to-face.
2. Cross-Examination
The right to cross-examination is so fundamental that the Supreme
Court held testimonial evidence inadmissible if the defendant was not
afforded such a right.159 Cross-examination allows the defense and
prosecution alike to show weaknesses in the opposing arguments and
reveal evidentiary facts. As the Melendez-Diaz Court noted, "[A]n ana-
lyst's lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed
in cross-examination."1 60 By subjecting analysts to cross-examination,
Melendez-Diaz furthered this protection of the integrity of the adversarial
process.
The Confrontation Clause is a constitutional guarantee that is meant
to prevent the conviction of the innocent. The dissent in Melendez-Diaz
worried that subjecting analysts to cross-examination would result in
"guilty" defendants going free on purely technical grounds. However,
this apprehension is misguided because every defendant is afforded a
presumption of innocence,162 which is removed only when the prosecu-
tion proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. If,
through the "crucible of cross-examination,"l63 among other means, the
prosecution fails to meet this burden, the defendant remains innocent.
This may result in the dismissal of some cases on technical grounds.
However, that result is better than stripping criminal defendants of their
constitutional rights based on a presumption of guilt. The Melendez-Diaz
decision correctly operated under the premise that revoking a defendant's
right to cross-examination based on a presumption of guilt would reorder
the prosecutorial system.
Additionally, the dissent's "parade of horribles,"l 64 if it does ensue,
will be short lived. If courts do become swamped with requests for live
158. Id. at 2532.
159. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
160. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
161. Id. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1859) ("The principle that there is a presump-
tion of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.").
163. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
164. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542 (characterizing the dissent's numerous arguments
against the majority decision as a "parade of horribles").
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testimony of analysts, it will not last for long. Once analysts are called to
the stand to testify regarding their work, labs will begin to increase train-
ing, accuracy, and accountability.165 Defense lawyers will soon realize
that calling a credible, careful, well-trained analyst is of no help to their
case; ultimately resulting in more reliable data, less court costs, and a
protection of the criminal defendant's right to cross-examination.
C. Upholding the Historical Intentions Behind the Confrontation Clause
Not only did the Melendez-Diaz decision uphold the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, it also upheld the historical principles'6 6 and inten-
tions behind the Sixth Amendment. The Bill of Rights was drafted as a
guarantee of individual rights and freedoms. Each specified right is one
the Founders considered important enough to enumerate. The Sixth
Amendment is an enumeration of the rights guaranteed to criminal de-
fendants. 167 The Confrontation Clause, specifically, was enacted in re-
sponse to the concern that evidence would be admitted unjustly against
criminal defendants.'
68
By interpreting the Confrontation Clause as a text that imparts,
rather than limits, rights of criminal defendants, the Melendez-Diaz Court
upheld the historical purposes and intentions behind the Clause. The
Sixth Amendment grants privileges, it does not limit them. If scientific
data was not subject to cross examination, the rights of criminal defen-
dants, as the Founders desired, would deteriorate. As the Founders in-
tended, Melendez-Diaz protected the rights of defendants.
D. Pendergrass v. State1 69: Begging an Unanswered Question of Melen-
dez-Diaz
Eventually, the Supreme Court will need to address some unan-
swered questions created by Melendez-Diaz. Which analyst is required to
testify is one such uncertainty.170 While the Court's Melendez-Diaz deci-
sion did "not mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must
be called,"'71 it did not specify any requirements for selecting which ana-
lyst should testify. Many phases are required for the production of most
165. Mark Hansen, Taking Techs to Trial: Two Terms in a Row, Justices Weigh Bringing Lab
Analysts into Court, 96 JAN. A.B.A. J. 17, 18 (2010) ("Stanford University law professor Jeffery L.
Fisher, who represented Melendez-Diaz, says the decision will help ensure that analysts will be
careful when they do their testing and will be held accountable when they make mistakes.")
166. See Justin Chou, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusets: Raising the Confrontation Require-
ments for Forensic Evidence in California, 14 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 439, 442-43 (2009) (discussing
various historical principles behind the Confrontation Clause).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
168. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (describing concerns of some early Americans regarding the
admission of evidence at trial and noting that "[t]he First Congress responded by including the
Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became the Sixth Amendment").
169. 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
170. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2532 (majority opinion).
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scientific reports submitted at trial. For example, DNA test results alone
go through several phases of analysis and exchange hands many times
before the results are finalized. Each report involves the work product
and supervision of numerous scientists.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to Pendergrass v.
State, 72 a case involving DNA certificates of analysis. 7 3 In Pendergrass,
the prosecution submitted DNA and paternity test results as evidence
against the defendant.174 Pursuant to Melendez-Diaz, a supervisor em-
ployed by the laboratory that produced the DNA results offered live tes-
timony at trial. The supervisor, Lisa Black, testified to the certificates of
analysis produced by her employers and general lab procedures, among
other things.'75 Ms. Black did not personally conduct the DNA testing.176
The defendant was convicted and appealed based on a Confrontation
Clause violation, arguing that Melendez-Diaz required the analyst who
actually produced the results to offer live testimony.177 The Supreme
Court of Indiana upheld the conviction and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
Pendergrass was correctly decided in light of the goals of the Con-
frontation Clause. The analyst offering live testimony should be one who
is in a position to testify to the general and specific scientific procedures
that lead to the data submitted as evidence against the defendant. The
purpose behind the analysts live testimony is to ensure reliable evidence
through cross examination. Subjecting Ms. Black to cross-examination
accomplished this goal. First, she was able to testify to the general testing
procedures that were used in conducting the scientific tests. Second, she
was able to testify to the specific procedure that occurred in order to pro-
duce the certificates of analysis that were ultimately submitted at trial. In
doing so, she offered the trier of fact information regarding the general
reliability of DNA testing in her laboratory and specific information re-
garding the reliability of the evidence presented against the defendant.
For now, courts are left to their own discretion in determining
which analyst's testimony is sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause requirements set forth in Melendez-Diaz. These determinations
must be made in light of the goal of achieving reliability through cross-
examination. However, the Supreme Court may eventually need to ad-
dress this unanswered question.
172. 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
173. See Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 704-05.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 705.




As new technologies expand, courts must determine what role, if
any, these scientific developments will play in criminal prosecutions.
These determinations must be made in light of and in a manner consis-
tent with constitutional guarantees and limits. Accordingly, the Melen-
dez-Diaz holding was decided correctly in light of the goals and guaran-
tees of the Confrontation Clause. The decision promotes the reliability of
evidence and opposes the use of ex parte examinations; it upholds the
fundamental Confrontation Clause guarantees of face-to-face confronta-
tion and cross-examination. Finally, the Melendez-Diaz Court upheld the
historical goals behind the Sixth Amendment by protecting the rights of
criminal defendants. The long-term, practical implications of Melendez-
Diaz remain to be seen. If negative conditions do result, these conse-
quences will be short lived. The true long-term effects of Melendez-Diaz
will be more reliable evidence, more accountability in the criminal jus-
tice system, more information available to the trier of fact, and a strong
guarantee of the rights of criminal defendants.
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